

# Can We Be More Strategic in our Support for Strategic Planning in Parliaments?

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WROXTON CONFERENCE 2017  
WESTMINSTER FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY

## *Introduction: Seeking to Become More Effective in Strategic Planning Interventions*

Supporting a parliament to develop a strategic plan plays a distinct role in the field of democracy assistance. The primary aim of this type of support is to help a parliament to map out what it wants to achieve and what is required to achieve that. It is frequently offered to parliaments to enable an international development actor to build a relationship with a parliament, determine areas for applied future support, and to get to know key actors and agents within a parliament. This type of support is provided to parliaments that do not have a strategic plan, do not have one that is up to date or satisfactory, or those seeking to define their development priorities, which may be referred to as a strategic development plan.<sup>1</sup>

A development programme that supports a parliament to create, or consider creating a strategic plan varies considerably across the international development space.<sup>2</sup> The precise approach adopted by the international actor will typically depend on: the parliament's needs and their degree of openness to strategic planning assistance (in general and from the organisation itself); the budget attached to the programme; and the organisation's implementation approach, experience, and access to relevant experts. Strategic planning interventions, however, tend to focus on five main outputs: a technical expert holding a series of consultations with relevant parliamentary actors; workshops and working sessions with relevant stakeholders; the publishing of a mission statement, vision statement, strategic plan and implementation plan (or some mix of these); a validation exercise with parliamentary leadership to give it an official seal of approval and a launch/communications event once drafted as a product. While less common, these programmes may also entail engagement with those outside parliament (CSOs, citizens, media, government).

The Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) has most recently supported several parliaments in this area, including the Parliaments of Morocco, Jordan, Botswana and Venezuela. These varied experiences have demonstrated the potential for this type of democracy assistance to play a greater role within WFD's programme portfolio. To contribute to this objective the paper looks at how the practice of strategic planning has evolved in the corporate world where the practice originated, to trigger thoughts and insights as to how this intervention could be built on in the international development sector. The most notable feature of this evolution is the sectoral shift away from stringent corporate planning methods, which at first sought to provide companies with the one true answer for business strategy, to an approach that instead focuses on individuals thinking strategically. Corporate strategic planning has turned from resting on planning techniques that presuppose an ideational process that is linear, non-iterative, time-bound, and top-down, to techniques that seek to tune-into actors at all levels, their views, ideas and capabilities.

The 'pitfalls of planning' (Mintzberg, 1994) identified in the corporate sphere resonate with the 'capability traps' (Andrews et al, 2013) identified by international development thinkers that urge against practitioners implementing products that often take the form of 'best practice' and that promote limited behaviours and ways of capacity development. In comparative ways, the practice of international development has fallen into the trap of creating development programmes around 'best practice' products that may lend external legitimacy but do not demonstrably improve performance. The alignment in both the problems and the lessons of decades of corporate strategic planning with those identified in the broader field of democracy assistance presents an opportunity for re-formulating future strategic planning interventions, against shared principles on what this practice should look-like. This would require a consolidated shift in the emphasis of these programmes from product to process, and for actors to seek to create programmes that appeal to three principles that the paper identifies as: *creating a climate of investigation, contextualised*

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<sup>1</sup> 'Strategic plan' and 'strategic development plan' are referred to in this paper as interchangeable terms, for although the origins may differ the form and purpose remains largely the same.

<sup>2</sup> Sources for this assertion include: conversations with various individuals and actors within the international development sphere, including WFD's programme teams, and the strategic plans of a number of different parliaments to get a scope of this work.

*problem identification*, and *learning loops*. To this effect, the paper outlines a three-phased approach and a toolkit to support this reformulated approach to strategic planning programmes.

### *The Evolution of Strategic Planning in the Corporate Sector*

Since its outset in the 1960's, corporate strategic planning has represented a movement of leading corporate strategists and thinkers developing methods to best enable companies to develop strategic plans that determine future investment and resource allocation (Mintzberg, 1987). For decades, this movement polished and refined strategic planning models, systems and processes to tightly steer companies down a path of effective strategy formation. Various planning products include: thick planning books, SWOT analysis, business plans, implementation plans, mapping tools, environmental scanning, balanced scorecards, financial forecasting (Mintzberg, 1981).

The premise of strategic planning in its early stages was the view that strategies should be developed primarily on rational rather than intuitive thinking, deductive rather than inductive reasoning. This approach involved separating thinking from doing in that effective corporate planning was seen to entail the abstraction of information for complex analysis and strategic decision-making by actors at the top of an organisation. Large corporations, in particular, created planning functions, or even divisions, to ensure that strategic plans were created to the formula set out by the strategic planning tools and methodology they chose to adopt (Mintzberg, 1987). 'Planning systems were expected to produce the best strategies as well as step by step instructions for carrying out those strategies so that doers could not get them wrong' (Mintzberg 1994).

Criticism for strategic planning began to emerge when leading corporations, strategists and thinkers began to question the effectiveness of strategic plans in delivering expected results (Gray 1986, Mintzberg 1994, Porter 1991). Companies were disillusioned by the limited correlation between their levels of investment and the end result. One corporate management academic, Mariann Jelinek (1979), made the early observation that strategic planning methods failed because they circumvented human idiosyncrasies by imposing specific ways of doing and thinking on senior corporate figures. This typified broader critiques that suggested strategic planning methods suppressed creative cognitive processes seen as essential to an effective outcome.

Complying with strict strategic planning methods was seen to choke initiative and invention, as an act of free thinking, needed to make companies perform. Planning methodologies were also criticised for denying a voice to those closest to the output and who were considered to hold information needed for companies to remain plugged into their markets (Mintzberg & Lampel). A leading corporate thinker from Harvard Business School, Henry Mintzberg (1994), set out the 'pitfalls of planning' to summarise strategic planning failures. From these pitfalls Mintzberg identified strategic planning's central fallacy: 'despite all those strategic planning diagrams (...) all those interconnected boxes (...) nowhere will you find a single one that explains the creative act of synthesizing experiences into a novel strategy'.

This led to the sustained observation that strategic planning should incorporate and encourage strategic thinking (Collins & Porras 1994, Heracleus 1998, Liedtka 1998). Corporate strategists and corporate management academics began debating the extent to which corporate planning systems should integrate more creative methodologies to foster creative ideas, and the extent to which decisions should be taken on the basis of ideas rather than hard facts. Two distinct positions emerged, the first of which promoted the wholesale replacement of strategic planning with strategic thinking, on the grounds that better strategy will emerge if individuals are free to think creatively without the constraints of a planning process (Hamel 1996 & Mintzberg 1994). The second argued that strategic thinking should be integrated into ordinary planning processes, on the grounds that creative cognitive processes need not necessarily be suppressed by planning methodologies (Bonn & Christodoulo 1996, Porter 1991 & later Hoffman 2008).

Current corporate strategic planning practices reflect this debate. Businesses tend to determine the extent to which they rely on strict informational review processes, or ones that solicit broad participation and promote free thinking and creativity, when deciding where to invest attention, time and resources.<sup>3</sup> As Liedtka (2005) noted, 'while the literature draws a sharp distinction between the creative and analytical aspects of strategy-making, both are clearly needed in any thoughtful strategy-making process'. On this basis, corporate strategists have been developing new methods and approaches for taking a mixed approach to strategic planning.<sup>4</sup> The scope of the tools and techniques employed has increased as leading thinkers and organisations turn to research from other sectors. According to more recent approaches, strategic planning should benefit from soliciting and incorporating a wider set of views as part of a challenge and refinement process. For example, Lovallo and Sibony (2010) posit a cognitive and behavioural approach to corporate strategy-making, and Brabandere and Iny, (2013) similarly turn to behavioural economists and social psychologists to promote carrying out 'belief audits' to challenge assumptions within planning processes. Increasingly more adaptive, decentralised, non-linear, non-hierarchical, and discursive planning techniques are being promoted by leading strategists and organisations of this sector (see for example, Spradlin 2012, Camillus 2008, Planellas & Svejnova 2006 & Hoffman 2006).

After decades of investing in and disseminating 'gold standard' techniques to corporate strategic planning, leading corporate strategists now develop strategy on the widely-accepted principle that strict conditioning processes do not generate the right sort of information for most companies to plan effectively, and that to create effective strategies, techniques that innovatively engage with the ideas of a broad set of actors can be more effective.<sup>5</sup>

### *Strategic Development Planning as a form of Democracy Assistance*

Supporting parliaments to produce a strategic plan or writing one on their behalf represents a sought-after opportunity for many international development actors. Helping create a strategic plan can help to set the foundations for effective future programming as the outside actor establishes key relationships within the institution. International actors may also see it as a way to combine their efforts to identify areas for future assistance, which typically entails an expert assessment of a parliament's challenges, and the delivery of a product or an 'output' (in the form of a strategic plan), of immediate effect and use. As such they also serve to divide up the work among implementers to avoid overlap. Strategic planning support can therefore also provide a 'deep dive' entry point between international actors and parliaments that have held no prior relationship with one another, as was the case in WFD's recent support to the National Assembly of Venezuela.

The UNDP's current programme with the Parliament of Myanmar (*Hluttaw*) is an example of the synthesis that often takes place between strategic planning, technical assessment and follow-up support. Owing to this synthesis the Hluttaw is presently implementing a strategic plan that aligns with the UNDP's current and provisioned areas of support. This example also demonstrates the appeal and the trend for international actors to carry out this form of democracy assistance at times when a parliament has a new leadership, when a parliament is operating under a new political settlement, or as a part of a legacy project as a leadership is leaving. International assistance is often welcomed in post-transition moments to provide extra support to the new dispensation, as it

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<sup>3</sup> Some interesting examples of how the creativity debate has evolved in corporate thinking can be found in various literature, including, the Economist article 'Creativity and Business Studies' 27 October 2011, Planellas & Svejnova (2006) and Kantabutra (2008).

<sup>4</sup> Large strategy consultancy firms such as McKinsey & Co and The Boston Consulting Group regularly publish research and analysis on this subject. See for example: Roxburgh (2013).

<sup>5</sup> A next area of research would be to find out how corporations conduct such processes and to find out whether they conduct training to support individuals to be more creative.

seeks to take full ownership of, comprehend, and on that basis transform the institution and consolidate the new political arrangement.<sup>6</sup>

However, for several reasons the impact and rationale for supporting the creation of a strategic plan is more nuanced than other areas of democracy assistance. The conditions to develop an effective strategy are difficult for well-established parliaments to guarantee, let alone parliaments operating in volatile, emergent, transitional, and resource-stricken contexts. These conditions include the sufficient buy-in from relevant actors, sufficient information, and sufficient financing for implementation. In addition, parliaments in various contexts grapple with the fundamental question of ‘who is in charge’ in a parliament and who has the authority to make decisions on a strategic plan (the Speaker, business committee, reform committee, Secretary of Parliament, Deputy Directors etc). Partly for this reason, parliaments of stable and long-established democratic systems, such as the UK House of Commons and Scottish Parliament, have only recently started to formulate strategic plans<sup>7</sup>, and have openly characterised this process as one of ‘trial and error’ (Interview conducted with Former Senior Parliamentary Official, and Senior Official of the Scottish Parliament in April 2017).

There is also a question as to whether parliaments need a strategic plan. Strategic planning originated in the private sector to support businesses to modify their offer in relation to shifts in market trends. A private company that does not know how it will adapt and respond to potential opportunities and risks may go out of business. While parliaments may be subject to outside forces, these forces do not tend to make a parliament go out of business, although they may be stripped of meaningful responsibility if people perceive them to be useless. A parliament’s competition is an Executive-only (more or less) system, which is determined prior to its establishment. In real terms, parliaments are one of the few institutions to operate in a non-competitive market in that there is no alternative, formally constituted, democratic institution to take their place if they do not perform well.

Supporting the development of a strategic plan, in and of itself, is also not equivalent to supporting a democratic output, such as an amended bill, redrafted guide to procedure, or skilled committee researcher. The end-product of a strategic planning programme is often the re-articulation of a parliament’s constitutional purpose into the form of a mission statement, accompanied by various forms of documentation that set out agreed objectives and an implementation plan, with some parliaments being known to copy and paste the vision and mission statements of other parliaments for this reason.<sup>8</sup>

It is often the case, to the lament of both parliaments and international actors, that agreed upon plans are not fully implemented. This turns the spotlight onto the planning methodology international actors use to create the strategic plan, as was the case in the corporate sector, with the implication that planning programmes do not foster broad-based lower-level ownership over the identification of challenges and their solutions. Moreover, reflective practitioners express a scepticism as to the extent to which methodologies used by the international actor are predisposed to identifying only the problems for which they know they can support the solution.<sup>9</sup> There is also a natural tendency to recommend standard, cookie cutter approaches instead of real innovation or

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<sup>6</sup> For example, WFD’s work with the National Assembly of Venezuela falls within this category of strategic planning support.

<sup>7</sup> The UK House of Commons only began to take this process seriously at the beginning of the 2000s, and worked on several partial plans before issuing its comprehensive “New Parliament 2010” strategic plan. Similarly, while the Scottish Parliament first discussed the idea of a strategic plan after its opening in 1999, it took two years to get it operationalised and the entire process has since undergone a series of revisions to get it into a form that is useful and effective.

<sup>8</sup> This insight was provided by two international development experts, both of which have provided technical inputs to strategic planning processes in several different parliaments.

<sup>9</sup> This was a point of discussion with those interviewed as part of this research in relation to international practice in general, with points raised that challenged the synthesising of technical assessments, strategic planning and follow-up support.

on the basis of seeking to move the ball forward as much as possible within a given context given local conditions, political realities, and traditions. The central concern relates to the fact that it is not always clear the extent to which the effect of a strategic plan intervention is one that enables a parliament to do its job or one that enables the international actor to do theirs.

This challenge arises from, and is sustained by, the limited amount of information, particularly quantitative, used to create a parliamentary strategic plan. While private companies can readily integrate basic statistical information about their performance (e.g. their profit and loss, market share, and market trends) parliaments that development actors support are often not able to produce, publish or provide access to substantive pieces of information.<sup>10</sup> For example, underfunded or less established parliaments often do not hold accurate records of decisions taken in the House, and can struggle to provide complete information relating to elementary parliamentary transactions, such as the number of bills amended or the number of committee reports tabled within a given session.

When this information is held by a parliament, it is often not clear who within the institution is responsible for it. Officials often direct the international actor to the individual they understand to be in charge of compiling a particular record yet that individual claims no such responsibility, or believes it to be held elsewhere. In a recent project, for example, the Parliament of Sierra Leone detailed their records of committee reports including which committee reports had been considered by the House and whether follow-up action had been taken, but this information was never located amongst the personnel identified. The essence of the problem is both that parliaments do not record information in a systematic way, make that information widely accessible or act on it.

Parliaments can also be reluctant to share certain types of information. For example, parliaments are often cautious about sharing information relating to the state of their finances, budget allocation, or their human resources including their hiring and evaluation practices, most likely because they are unsure as to how this information will support the international actor as well as concerns around their response to this more sensitive information. Yet this information alone comprises three of the most fundamental building blocks for effective strategic planning, and is vital to the credibility of any plan that seeks to determine future resource allocation, and targeted reform measures.

These challenges resonate with the 'capability traps' identified by development academics Matt Andrews, Lance Pritchard, and Michael Woolcock (2013). Capability traps emerge when: international actors reproduce external solutions considered 'best practice', formulate a project as following a 'pre-determined linear process', support 'tight monitoring of inputs and compliance'; and when a project is 'driven from the top-down' on the assumption that it 'can largely never be implemented by edict' (2013 p235).<sup>11</sup> These 'capability traps' are similar to the 'pitfalls of planning' identified after decades of strategic planning in the corporate sector, and the solutions put forward in this sector also resonate with those Andrews et al propose. Andrews et al (2013) advocate a Problem-Driven, Iterative Adaptation (PDIA) approach to international development interventions that prompts external actors to: solve a problem that is identified in context and prioritized by local actors; that enables local actors at all levels to experiment with context-based solutions; that encourages local actors deviate from norms or best practices; that supports or creates opportunities for learning and iterative feedback loops; and that represents measures that stem from the ideas of a broad set of actors (Andrews et al 2013 p235).

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<sup>10</sup> Sometimes other actors collect this data but do not always share it with parliament, such as civil society organisations that monitor a parliament or government ministries and agencies. The challenge for the international actor is to identify this disconnect and seek to open up structured informational channels.

<sup>11</sup> These observations resonate with other leading development research, such as Stewart & Knaus (2011), Andrews & Wescott (2008), and Spradlin (2012)

## *Switching from Product to Process: A Three-staged Approach to Creating a Climate of Investigation, Contextualised Problem Identification and Learning Loops*

The comparative challenges and lessons from decades of corporate investment in strategic planning with the challenges and proposed solutions of these development thinkers, makes the case for reformulating strategic planning programmes to align with convergent principles on what this practice should look like. Derived from the comparative lessons of both corporate and development sectors, strategic planning programmes could seek to: *create a climate of investigation, ensure contextualised problem identification; and encourage learning loops.*

To begin appealing to these principles, however, these programmes need to be reformulated as an investment in a process rather than a product. Supporting a parliament to develop a strategic plan is not primarily one that seeks to deliver reforms, or impress solutions. This presents actors with a significant opportunity to focus the intervention on setting the framework within which external and internal actors gather information (the process) that would include facilitating idea sharing, brainstorming, mentoring stakeholders, keeping momentum going accountability for actors on this momentum. By focusing on supporting an effective process international actors can appeal to the three consolidated principles above by supporting actors to improve their knowledge and investigate what is happening in a parliament; helping them to agree on key contextualised problems for investment; and encouraging parliaments to invest in those lessons and knowledge systems as 'learning loops' that can support subsequent planning and reform processes. The strategic plan, as a (reformulated) product of this process, may hold consequential democratic value for the parliament. However, the impact of the intervention may be maximised if it is focused directly on optimising the conditions for effective strategic planning formation.<sup>12</sup>

The appendix contains a toolkit to support international actors in making this shift.<sup>13</sup> It provides the framework for enabling international actors to generate iterative planning processes that prompt parliamentary actors to think through problems and solutions, and for enabling all actors, both local and international, to engage in investigative exercises of information building - the foundation of contextualised problem identification. For parliamentary planning processes to appeal to the three previously outlined principles, what is needed is information that tests key concerns about what is not working, exhibits where inefficiencies exist within a particular institution (held against an efficient model of that particular system rather than any other parliamentary system), and encourages 'positive deviance' (Andrews et al 2013) in how these challenges are addressed, so as 'to support feasible remedial action [that] can be meaningfully pursued in search for solutions' (Chan 2013 p.3). Investigative exercises should support contextualised problem identification by provoking both local and international actors to gather and collate information on identified focal points ('problems'), to provide them with further insight on those areas, and to test their assumptions.<sup>14</sup> These investigative processes may also help actors to guard against

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<sup>12</sup> While current approaches do often lend support to the process of strategic planning within a parliament, and can contribute to elements of these outcomes, this does not seem to be the primary and pre-determined intention of these interventions. As such there is scant discussions relating specifically to the impact of these interventions on a parliament's more robust and effective internal planning process pre- and post-intervention.

<sup>13</sup> The toolkit includes a suggested programme outline that may support actors to achieving the three principles. It also contains a pre-planning survey, and a planning and evaluation framework on four example areas of analysis.

<sup>14</sup> Creating a climate of investigation and carrying out measures to improve learning is also justified when it comes to the determination of resources to solve problems. problems have multiple causes, and the multiplicity of a problem cannot always be arrived at through one data source (Andrews et al, 2013).

'isomorphic mimicry', seen as the tendency to introduce reforms that enhance an entity's external legitimacy but do not demonstrably improve performance (Andrews et al, 2013 p235).<sup>15</sup>

A shift from product to process is one that would focus on creating structures and systems for discussing and driving reforms. Parliaments often struggle to reach agreement on objectives, timelines, responsibilities, and monitoring processes. Parliaments also tend to enact such measures via hierarchical arrangements, and therefore with little experience in encouraging and operationalising multi-stakeholder engagement, creative brainstorming, and communicative processes for reaching agreement on objectives and authorising incremental locally-owned reform measures.

The lack of diversified, tested, quantifiable information represents another key challenge to parliaments identifying contextualised problems, and the greatest challenge for the credibility of an international actor's work in this area.<sup>16</sup> The focus on improving information through a variety of interventions aimed at creating a climate of investigation, and fostering learning loops, should therefore be seen as the overarching precept to a reformulated strategic planning programme. This focus is also worthwhile for several other related reasons. For a start, it is often an emerging parliament's lack of resources and/or know-how that prevents it from holding accurate, complete or comprehensive records on its transactions and performance. To support a parliament in this area would therefore be equivalent to supporting its improved long-term internal capacity and democratic capability.

Qualified and quantitative information, which is most lacking in resource-poor contexts, also has the potential to shed new light on previously identified challenges, as well as illuminate new ones. This may help actors to see problems differently, and carry out 'positive deviances' as alternative ways of overcoming problems that are grounded in the context of the problem (Andrews et al 2013).<sup>17</sup> For example, in a recent visit to the Parliament of Morocco, specific information relating to the age profile of its staff and staff turnover was obtained for the first time, which when analysed, transformed their perspective on the institution's human resource challenge. This is currently enabling WFD to facilitate discussions to change the age profile of its workforce - a shift from the parliament's previous intentions.

Integrating quantitative information and qualifiable information, specifically, should also make it easier for actors to feed it into 'learning loops' over a longer-term period, as oral accounts cannot be expected to remain relevant over long periods of time or be replicable. Learning loops that contain information relating to longer terms trends should also facilitate local ownership after the planning process and contribute to local ownership of subsequent planning processes. Seeking to diversify the information used to create a strategic plan may, in addition, circumvent the risk of undemocratic forces such as internal power relations, or cognitive biases<sup>18</sup>, arising from the fact that international actors rely heavily on qualitative information that they generate through face to face consultations, workshops or conferences. This is an important challenge to overcome as the risk of doing harm may be greater as the focus of this action is on determining resource allocation

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<sup>15</sup> This is distinct from having 'external legitimacy' be one of parliament's strategic aims, as parliaments often seek to improve people's perception of its performance in instances where there is a disconnect between a what a parliament does and people's understanding of its role.

<sup>16</sup> For example, the number of: sitting days, committee meetings, committee inquiries, question sessions, Ministers statements, bills passed/rejected/amended, committee reports tabled/debated/adopted.

<sup>17</sup> Andrews et al state that positive deviances are demonstrable and quick wins resulting from actors defying typical norms relating to the way things are usually done. This builds on Pascale, Sternin & Sternin (2010) observation on unlikely innovators solving the world's problems. Similar observations have been made on the power of promoting experimental behaviour, see for example Pritchett (2011) and Briggs (2008).

<sup>18</sup> Behavioural economists, social psychologists and others have shown that we routinely make mistakes based on normal, built-in cognitive factors rather than because we have weighed all the evidence and made a deliberate rational decision. For an eclectic mix of these studies see: Tversky & Kahneman 1983, Stein 1996, Preston & Harris 1965, Li y 2011 & Henslin 196



in extremely resource-limited contexts. There are instances in which parliaments have outsourced its strategic planning to large international actors as part of an understood deal that the agreed upon strategic plan would lead to increased donor investment.

However, while adding to the informational base is central to the reformulated approach proposed, there are risks attached to trying to integrate quantitative information into planning processes. The four main risks are: the inaccurate collation of information, the inaccurate comprehension of information, the misinterpretation of information and the misapplication of information. Evidently, there is no perfect age balance for parliamentary staff, there is no perfect number of bills passed, or length of debate etc. The value of quantitative information must always be derived from the context of its use and application, via the suggested approach, to help ensure quantitative information is not translated into inappropriate target-setting, or the source of distorted incentives.

The toolkit has been developed to prompt international and local actors to tackle the informational challenge at the centre of strategic planning programmes, moreover provide a framework for *creating a climate of investigation, ensuring contextualized problem identification, and encouraging learning loops*. The toolkit does this in two main ways. First, the toolkit provides a three-phased outline of suggested steps actors could take to supporting a strategic planning process that appeals to these consolidated principles (appendix one). Phase one prompts international actors to, at the outset, frame their support as one that seeks to generate investigate practices, identify contextualised problems to support discussions on reform measures, and encourage learning loops. As part of this phase, the pre-planning survey (appendix two) may enable outside actors to get an upfront understanding of a parliament's internal records and record-keeping capacity prior to engagement, and it may also provide a useful tool for subsequent facilitations processes. Phase two of the approach proposes broad-based consultations to identify contextualised problems to be tested or investigated at the second stage of this phase. While a distinction has been made between the oral consultations of stage one, and obtaining other quantifiable and quantitative information at stage two, it is expected that actors move iteratively and fluidly between the two. This iterative process of information building would support a climate of investigation, assumption-challenging, informational activism, and learning, if the process is sufficiently broad-based and communicative. The rigour of the process would also be supported if international actors employ discursive techniques during consultations and facilitation-sessions that dig deep into the problems and solutions participants identify. This may be achieved by actors designing a series of questions or by employing a specific discursive technique.<sup>19</sup> Phase three of the approach prompts actors to encourage 'learning loops' as part of the process of writing a strategic plan. Templates for 'learning loop' action plans could be developed if it the potential for it to be a live document is seen to exist.

Second, the Planning and Evaluation Framework (appendix three) sets out the quantitative information needed to evaluate a parliament's performance in four example areas: public engagement, representation, accountability and law-making.<sup>20</sup> Indicators for measuring gender equality have been included to ensure gender equality is integral to all strategic planning processes and developmental reforms. Actors can remove/add to the indicators contained in this framework according to the problems identified. The Planning and Evaluation Key (appendix three) aims to

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<sup>19</sup> For example, Andrews et al (2013) propose a 5-way method that asks individuals to respond five times to the same question: 'why does it matter?' but new and emerging tools are available such as the 'venn-diagram' as an approach to building consensus on problems recently used by the National Democratic Institute that helps MPs to strategic on consensus and ethics reform (see Hartz' blog 'Myanmar MPs Strategize on Consensus and Ethics Reform' at the NDI website 10 July 2017).

<sup>20</sup> Additional planning evaluation frameworks can be developed to focus on other identified priority areas, for example, financial oversight.

prevent inaccurate interpretations of quantitative information by stating the implication of each category of information.

The framework distinguishes between indicators that measure the performance of parliament's main chamber and the indicators that measure the performance of committees. This should enable parliaments and practitioners to obtain a clearer understanding of what reforms are needed and how to allocate resources across these two spheres. This information should also directly support high-level coaching on the relationship between these two spheres, and therefore the importance of recording their transactions. The framework also distinguishes between information relating to the administration of parliament and information relating to the conduct of parliamentary business. It is hoped this will facilitate strategic planning discussions between a parliament's administrative and political leaders. The distinction is also necessary to enable users to evaluate what is key to resolving identified problems (e.g. resource, capabilities, or working culture, hierarchies), and in turn identify the corrective measures needed to improve performance.

### *Conclusion: Making Strategic Planning Interventions More Effective*

Strategic planning has evolved away from imposing stringent planning methodologies that set strict conditions for how a company ought to determine its strategy, and in particular the sources of information used, forms of analysis undertaken, access to this process, and time-frames set. After decades of disappointing results, the identified 'pitfalls of planning' prompted corporate strategists to advance strategic planning practices that seek to tune into creative and behavioural cognitive processes, through discursive interactions and techniques that are less rigid, less linear and more broad-based. The resonance of this finding with the capability traps and progressive PDIA framework proposed by development thinkers, provides the impetus for drawing on both sets of comparative insights, both the problems and the proposed solutions, to reformulate strategic planning interventions.

Strategic planning interventions by international development actors could in turn be more effective if they appeal to three consolidated principle outcomes: *creating a climate of investigation*; *enabling contextualised problem identification* and *encouraging learning loops*. For this to happen international actors need to switch the focus and emphasis away from product to process. What has made this area of democracy assistance unique is that it is an investment in the way a parliament interacts with its problems and maps out its reform objectives rather than achieving one of those objectives. A reformulated strategic planning programme should focus and build on this unique attribute for it provides this type of programming with significant potential to lead the way in delivering contextualised, incremental and adaptive international development practices.

The three-phased approach outlined in this paper proposes an overarching structure for a reformulated support programme that seeks to achieve identified principal outcomes. This is accompanied by a pre-planning survey and four example planning and evaluation frameworks. These modifiable frameworks aim to support actors to actively tackle the informational vacuum that straight-jackets the credibility of current planning practices, and constrains the levels of empowerment strategic processes can produce (knowledge is power). The overarching democratic outcome of a programme that activates a parliament in all three principal-outcome areas is a parliament that is working towards the 'know-how-to-know' and the 'know-how-to-test-this-know-how', which could in turn make such interventions more strategic.

## Appendix 1: Three-Phase Approach to Parliamentary Planning Support

Creating a Climate of Investigation		
PHASE 1 Pre-Planning	Stage One	Pre-planning consultation and facilitated work-sessions with leadership, relevant informants, knowledge holders to agree on approach and obtain buy-in.
	Stage Two	Pre-planning survey of records and resources
	Stage Three	Pre-planning review of survey results; facilitated work sessions on broad-basis on parliament's existing knowledge and knowledge-systems; adaptation of planning evaluation framework; high-level consulting and coaching; Agree on measures for obtaining identified information through facilitated work-session with key actors on identified areas.
Contextualised Problem Identification		
PHASE 2 Planning	Stage One	Data collection/consultation on contextualised problem identification to challenge assumptions, filter contextualised problems identified and encourage learning, in constant iteration with stage two (quantitative/quantifiable)
	Stage Two	Data collection/consultation on contextualised problem identification to challenge assumptions, filter contextualised problems identified and encourage learning, in constant iteration with stage one (qualitative/quantifiable)
	Stage Three	Synthesis of data and follow-up consultation and facilitated work-sessions on information obtained and other identified gaps
Learning Loops		
PHASE 3 Post-Planning	Part One	Formulation of Strategic Development Plan, implementation plan, learning loops action plan (where identified as necessary), broad-based consultation and.
	Part Two	Determination of financial support (if any) to be provided by external actor, and consultation
	Part Three	Systematic review of learning loop development as part of future planning process

## Appendix 2: Pre-Planning Survey

What information does a parliament collect?	Who is responsible for this information?
Records	
<p><b>H O U S E</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you record the number of House sittings that take place? [yes/no]</li> <li>2. Do you hold and/collect information on the number of motions tabled in parliament? [yes/no]</li> <li>3. Do you produce Minutes of Proceedings? [yes/no] Are they up to date? [yes/no]</li> <li>4. Do you produce Hansard/Official Records of House sittings? [yes/no] Are they up to date? [yes/no]</li> <li>5. Do you have an attendance register for House sittings? [yes/no]</li> <li>6. Do you record the number of visitors to parliament? [yes/no]</li> <li>7. Do you record the number of visitors by gender? [yes/no]</li> <li>8. Do you record the number of visitors by age category? [yes/no]</li> <li>9. Do you record the issues of interest or general reasons visitors come to parliament? [yes/no]</li> <li>10. Do you record the number of petitions received by parliament? [yes/no]</li> <li>11. If yes, do you record the issues the petitions raise? [yes/no]</li> <li>12. Is any of the above information (a) online? (b) in the library (c) digitised (d) available in hard copy?</li> </ol>	
<p><b>C O M M I T T E E</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Do you record the number of committee meetings that take place? [yes/no]</li> <li>2. Do you record the number of committee reports that are written and/or tabled? [yes/no]</li> <li>3. Do you record the number of time a committee goes on an oversight visit? [yes/no]</li> <li>4. Do you record the number of committee meetings focused on reviewing legislation? [yes/no]</li> <li>5. Do you record the number of committee meetings focused on member initiated business [not legislation]? [yes/no]</li> <li>6. Do you record the attendance of MPs in a committee meeting? [yes/no]</li> <li>7. Do you record the number of times individuals (e.g. the Executive, state officials, experts, the public) attend a committee meeting?</li> </ol>	

Resources	
H O U S E	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How many people are employed by parliament excluding cleaners and security personnel?</li> <li>2. How many people directly support the work of the House (e.g. plenary sittings, the processing of questions and the Presiding Officer)? [specify number]</li> <li>3. How many people transcribe House sittings (work in the Official Reports/Hansard department)? [specify number]</li> <li>4. How many vacancies are there for positions providing support to the work of the House? [specify number]</li> <li>5. What is the total budget allocated to parliament for the House (as relevantly quantified)? [specify number]</li> </ol>
C O M M I T T E E	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How many people providing clerical/administrative support to committees? [specify number]</li> <li>2. How many people are providing research/content support to committees (if not the same as the above)? [specify number]</li> <li>3. How many vacancies are there for positions providing support to committees? [specify number]</li> </ol> <p>What is the total budget allocated to parliament for committees (as relevantly quantified)? [specify number]</p>

### Appendix 3: Planning Evaluation Framework

Planning Evaluation Framework Key			
BPR	Baseline Performance Rating	Traffic light rating of overall performance for each set of indicators on a specified area.	1 (red): Considerable attention needed 2 (amber): More/some attention needed

			3 (green): Minimal/no attention needed
N	Nominal Indicators	This information gives an indication of the level of activity taking place in specified areas.	1 (red): Insufficient to no activity in specified area, considerable attention needed 2 (amber): Some significant activity in specified area, some/more attention needed 3 (green): Significant activity in specified area, minimal/no attention needed
Q	Qualified Indicators	This information gives an indication of how efficient, effective and impactful a parliament's work is in specified areas.	1 (red): Insufficient to no meaningful performance in specified area, considerable attention needed 2 (amber): Some meaningful performance in specified area, some/more attention needed 3 (green): Significant performance in specified area, minimal/no attention needed
C	Comparative Indicators	This information gives an indication of the level of progress being made over time in a specified area.	1 (red): Minimal/no progress being made in specified area, considerable attention needed 2 (amber): Some progress made in specified area, some/more attention needed 3 (green): Considerable progress made in specified area, minimal/no attention needed

Strategic Focus Area: Public Engagement

- Measures the level and the proficiency of a parliament in hosting visitors and communicating its core business as a standard operating practice.

Democratic output		Public Engagement					
		Political Indicators		BPR	Administration Indicators		BPR
H O U S E	N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No of petitions received by parliament (a) each month; and (b) each year</li> <li>No of petitions responded to (a) each month; and (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No of visitors to parliament; (a) each month; and (b) each year</li> <li>No of visitors attending a sitting, (a) each month; (b) each year</li> <li>No of sitting days</li> <li>No of Hansard debates published</li> </ol>		1 - 3
	Q	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of petitions received and responded to by parliament (a) each month (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Proportion of visitors to parliament and those attending a sitting (a) each month (b) each year</li> <li>Proportion of Hansards published to number of sittings</li> </ol>		1 - 3
	C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Total comparative breakdown of number of petitions received, (a) with those of another parliament; (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> <li>Proportional comparative break down of petitions responded to (a) with those of another parliament; (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Total comparative breakdown of number of outside visitors to (a) parliament (b) a House sitting (a) with those of another parliament; (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> <li>Total comparative breakdown of Hansards published to sittings across different years of this parliament.</li> </ol>		1 - 3
	N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No of public submissions received by a committee (a) each month; and (b) each year</li> <li>No of public submissions responded to by each committee (a) per month (b) per</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No of outside visitors attending a committee meeting (a) each month (b) each year (per committee)</li> </ol>		1 - 3

C O M M I T T E E	Q	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of public submissions received by each committee in relation to the total received (a) per month (b) per year</li> <li>2. Proportion of public submissions responded to in relation to the total responded to by each committee (a) per month (b) per year</li> </ol>		1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of individuals attending each committee in relation to the total (a) each month (b) each year</li> <li>2. Proportion of visitors to parliament and those attending a committee meeting (a) each month (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 – 3
	C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total comparative breakdown of public submissions received by each committee (a) with those of another parliament; (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> <li>2. Proportional comparative breakdown of public submissions received (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament</li> </ol>		1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total comparative breakdown of outside visitors attending a committee; (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament</li> <li>2. Proportional comparative breakdown of the number of individuals attending each committee (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament</li> </ol>		1 – 3



Strategic Focus Area: Representation

- Measures the level and the proficiency by which a parliament provides a platform for different voices to be heard on the part of outside publics and inside representatives

Democratic output		Representation					
		Political indicators		BPR	Administration indicators		BPR
H O U S E	N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total number of sitting days</li> <li>2. No of motions requested for debate (a) each month; and (b) each year.</li> <li>3. No of motions debated (a) each month; and (b) each year.</li> <li>4. Number of motions requested by (i) political party (ii) gender of MP (iii) age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) race/ethnicity of MP.</li> <li>5. No of motions requested by policy sector (a) each month; and (b) each year.</li> <li>6. No of motions debated by policy sector (a) each month; and (b) each year.</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total no of visitors each month</li> <li>2. No of (i) women visiting parliament (a) each month; (b) each year</li> <li>3. No of under 35's visiting parliament (a) each month; (b) each year</li> <li>4. No of individuals visiting parliament from [<i>insert regions of the country</i>]</li> <li>5. No of individuals visiting parliament from [<i>insert different ethnic groups</i>]</li> </ol>		1 - 3
	Q	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of motions debated (over total number of sitting days)</li> <li>2. Proportion of motions debated (over total requested) that were initiated (a) each month; and (b) each year (i) by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) by age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) by race of MP.</li> <li>3. Proportion of motions debated by policy sector (over total requested) (a) each month; and (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of (a) women visitors (b) visitors under 35 (d) visitors from the different region (e) visitors from different ethnic groups</li> </ol>		1 - 3
	C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total comparative breakdown of motions requested (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> <li>2. Total comparative breakdown of motions debated (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b)</li> </ol>		1 - 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total comparative breakdown of visitors to parliament (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> <li>2. Proportional comparative breakdown of (a) women visitors (b) visitors under 35 (d) visitors from the different region (e) visitors from different ethnic groups;</li> </ol>		1 - 3

		<p>across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p> <p>3. Proportional comparative breakdown of motions debated (out of total received) (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament</p> <p>4. Total comparative breakdown of motions requested by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) by age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) by race of MP (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p> <p>5. Proportional comparative breakdown of motions debated (i) by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) by age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) by race/ethnicity of MP with (a) those of another parliament; and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p>			parliament across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.		
C O M M I T T E E	N	<p>1. Total number of committee meetings per committee (a) each month and (b) each year;</p> <p>2. Total MP attendance per committee (a) each month and (b) each year</p> <p>3. Total MP attendance per committee by (i) by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) by age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) by race/ethnicity of MP</p>		1 – 3	<p>1. Total number of individuals attending a committee (a) each month; (b) each year</p> <p>2. No of (i) women attending a committee (a) each month; (b) each year</p> <p>3. No of (i) under 35's and (ii) over 35 attending a committee (a) each month; (b) each year</p> <p>4. No of individuals attending a committee from [<i>insert regions of the country</i>]</p> <p>5. No of individuals attending a committee from [<i>insert different ethnic groups</i>]</p>		1 – 3
	Q	<p>1. Proportion of committee meetings by committee in terms of (a) month total and (b) year total</p> <p>2. Proportion of MP committee attendance per committee by (i) by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) by age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) by race/ethnicity of MP in terms of (a) month total number of meetings and (b) year total of meetings</p>		1 – 3	<p>1. Proportion of (a) women visitors (b) visitors under 35 (d) visitors from the different region (e) visitors from different ethnic groups to committees (i) each month (ii) each year.</p>		1 – 3
		<p>1. Total comparative breakdown of total number of committee meetings with (a) those of another</p>		1 – 3	<p>1. Total comparative breakdown of visitors to committees (a) with those of another parliament; and/or (b) across</p>		1 – 3

	C	<p>parliament and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p> <p>2. Total comparative breakdown of MP attendance in committee with (a) those of another parliament and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p> <p>3. Proportional comparative breakdown of MP attendance per committee by (i) by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) by age of MP [under-&amp;-over 35] (iv) by race/ethnicity of MP with (a) those of another parliament and/or (b) across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p>			<p>different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p> <p>2. Proportional comparative breakdown of (a) women visitors (b) visitors under 35 (d) visitors from the different region (e) visitors from different ethnic groups; parliament across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</p>		
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Strategic Focus Area: Accountability

- Measures the appetite as well as the practice of a parliament in carrying out various acts of parliamentary oversight

Democratic output		Accountability					
		Political Indicators		BPR	Administration Indicators		BPR
H O U S E	N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total number of sitting days</li> <li>2. No of oral questions asked</li> <li>3. No of written questions asked</li> <li>4. No of oral questions asked (i) by political party (ii) by gender of MP (iii) age of MP [under-v-over 35] (iv) race of MP</li> <li>5. No of written questions asked by political party</li> <li>6. No of committee reports on non-government business tabled (a) each month and (b) each year</li> <li>7. No of committee reports on non-government business debated (a) each month and (b) each year</li> <li>8. No of substantive motions against a member of government tabled each year</li> <li>9. No of substantive motions against a member of government debated each year</li> </ol>		1-3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No of tabled committee reports published in Hansard (a) each month (b) each year</li> <li>2. No of motions (non-government business) debated (a) each month (b) each year</li> <li>3. No of motions (non-government business) transcribed in Hansard (a) each month (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 – 3
	Q	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of oral questions (i) answered by government (ii) orally in the House; and (iii) in writing of the total asked</li> <li>2. Proportion of written questions answered by government of the total asked</li> <li>3. Oral questions asked as a proportion of (i) governing party MPs; (ii) opposition MPs</li> <li>4. Proportion of committee reports on non-government business tabled by total number of sitting days (a) each month and (b) each year</li> <li>5. Proportion of committee reports debated on non-government business of the total tabled (a) each month (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of motions debated (non-government business) published in Hansard as a total of those tabled (a) each month (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 – 3

C O M M I T T E E		6. Proportion of substantive motions debated of the total tabled for debate each year				
	C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Comparative breakdown of questions asked by political party across different years</li> <li>2. Comparative breakdown of the proportion of committee reports debated by the number tabled across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.</li> <li>3. Comparative breakdown of the proportion of substantive motions debated as a total of those tabled across different years</li> </ol>		1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Comparative breakdown of number of committee reports (non-government business) tabled across different (i) months and (ii) years</li> <li>2. Comparative breakdown of number of motions (non-government business) published in Hansard across different years</li> </ol>	1 – 3
	N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No of committee meetings (a) each month; and (b) each year per committee</li> <li>2. No of committee days spent on non-legislative work (a) each month; and (b) each year per committee</li> <li>3. No of times (a) a member of the Executive (b) government official (c) other came to committee (i) each month (ii) each year per committee</li> <li>4. No of committee oversight visits undertaken (a) each month (b) each year</li> </ol>		1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Total no of staff in parliament [excluding cleaners and security personnel]</li> <li>2. No of staff employed to provide administrative support to committees</li> <li>3. No of staff employed to provide research/content support to committees [if different from above]</li> <li>4. No of committee reports written (a) each month and (b) each year per committee on non-government business</li> <li>5. Total size (number of personnel) of parliament's administration</li> <li>6. No of committee support staff per committee each year</li> </ol>	1 – 3
Q	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of committee meetings held by each committee in relation to the total number held (a) each month (b) each year</li> <li>2. Proportion of Executive attendance in committee in relation to the total attendance across all committees (a) each month and (b) each year</li> <li>3. Ratio of time spent on non-government business in relation to the total time spent on non-government business across all committees (a) each month and (b) each year</li> <li>4. Proportion of committee oversight visits undertaken (a) each month and (b) each year per committee in relation to total number undertaken.</li> </ol>		1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of committee (a) administrative staff and (c) research/content staff in relation to total no of staff in parliament</li> <li>2. Proportion of reports written on non-government business per committee in relation to the total number published per committee (a) each month and (b) each year</li> <li>3. Proportion of committee support staff in relation to the total number of personnel within the parliamentary service</li> <li>4. Proportion of committee support staff per committee in relation to the total number of (a) committee support staff and (b) entire parliamentary service</li> </ol>	1 – 3	

C	1. Comparative breakdown of number of committee meetings per committee across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.	1 – 3	1. Proportional comparative breakdown of no of committee support staff across different years of this parliament	1 – 3
	2. Comparative breakdown of days spent on non-legislative work across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.		2. Comparative breakdown of the proportion of reports written (i) in total and (ii) per committee in relation to the number of reports written across different years of this parliament	
	3. Comparative breakdown of Executive attendance in committee across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.		3. Comparative breakdown of the total number of committee support staff in relation to the total number across different years of this parliament	
	4. Comparative breakdown of oversight visits undertaken across different (i) months and (ii) years of this parliament.		4. Proportional comparative breakdown of committee support staff in relation to the total number of parliamentary personnel across the different years of this parliament.	

Strategic Focus Area: Law-Making

- Measures the breadth and the efficiency with which a parliament carries out its legislative function

Democratic output		Law-Making			
		Political Indicators	BPR	Administration Indicators	BPR
H O U S E	N	1. No of bills introduced each year 2. No of bills (a) passed (b) rejected by the House each year 3. No of government bills introduced each year 4. No of government bills (a) passed and (b) rejected each year 5. No of non-government bills introduced each year 6. No of non-government bills (a) passed and (b) rejected each year	1 – 3	1. Total no of staff in parliament [excluding cleaners and security personnel] 2. No of individuals employed to provide legal technical assistance to parliament	1 – 3
	Q	1. Proportion of government bills (a) introduced (b) passed (c) rejected each year 2. Proportion of non- government bills (a) introduced (b) passed (c) rejected each year	1 – 3	1. Proportion of individuals employed to provide legal technical assistance to parliament in relation to the total number of staff in parliament.	1 – 3

	C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Comparative breakdown of total number of bills passed by parliament across different years</li> <li>2. Proportional comparative breakdown of number of government bills (a) introduced (b) passed (c) rejected each year</li> <li>3. Proportional comparative breakdown of number of non-government bills (a) introduced (b) passed (c) rejected each year</li> </ol>	1 – 3	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportional comparative number of individuals employed to provide legal technical assistance across different years</li> </ol>	1 – 3
C O M M I T T E E	N	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. No of bills sent to committee (a) each year (b) per committee</li> <li>2. No of committee days spent on bills (a) each year (b) per committee</li> <li>3. No of non-government bills sent to committee (a) each year (b) per committee</li> <li>4. No of committee days spent on non-government bills (a) each year (b) per committee</li> <li>5. No of bill-related public hearings (a) each year (b) per committee</li> </ol>	1 – 3	N/A	1 – 3
	Q	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Proportion of days spend on (a) government bills (b) non-government bills each year, per committee</li> <li>2. Proportion of days spend on (a) non-government bills (b) non-government bills each year, per committee</li> <li>3. Proportion of bill-related public hearings (a) each year (b) per committee</li> </ol>	1 – 3	N/A	1 – 3
	C	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Comparative breakdown of total number of government bills sent to committee across different years</li> <li>2. Comparative breakdown of total number of non-government bills set to committee across different years</li> <li>3. Proportional comparative breakdown of committee days spent on government bills each year across different years</li> <li>4. Proportional comparative breakdown of committee days spent on government bills each</li> </ol>	1 – 3	N/A	1 – 3

		year across different years			
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## Source Materials

Materials developed and provided by WFD programme

Materials developed and provided by UNDP and EU programme

Status reviews, reports and papers from team work various parliaments on strategic development planning

UNDP made available synthesis working documents on strategic development planning

Interviews with experts and practitioners in this area, as well as with parliamentary officials from the UK House of Commons and Devolved Assemblies.

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